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  11. Introduction 
 
  The interaction between oligopolistic product markets and unionized labor markets 
has been studied in the literature on wage bargaining in terms of two main bargaining 
structures: one in which firms negotiate with independent unions at the firm level and one 
in which each firm bargains with an industry-wide union; in both structures, wage 
negotiations can take place either simultaneously or sequentially (see, for example, Horn 
and Wolinsky, 1988; Davidson, 1988; Dobson, 1994; Bárcena-Ruiz, 2003). These studies 
have been extended to consider the interaction between different union-firm bargaining 
structures and innovation under oligopoly (see, for example, Tauman and Weiss, 1987; 
Ulph and Ulph, 1998; Calabuig and González-Maestre, 2002). 
 
  The literature that studies the interaction between union-firm bargaining structures 
and innovation does not consider that wages can be bargained either sequentially or 
simultaneously, which affects the R&D investments of the firms.1 To fill this gap in the 
literature, we analyze how the timing of wage bargaining affects the R&D investments of 
firms and whether unions prefer to set wages sequentially or simultaneously. 
 
In relation with this last issue, De Fraja (1993), Corneo (1995) and Bárcena-Ruiz 
and Campo (2000, 2001) show that when firms do not invest in R&D and wage bargaining 
is decentralized at firm level, unions prefer sequential negotiations. Sequential negotiations 
lead to higher wages and lower employment than simultaneous bargaining.  
 
The literature is ambiguous in regard to the impact of union rent-seeking behavior 
on firms’ incentives to invest.2 Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) argue that most U.S. studies 
                                                 
1 Bargaining structures in developed countries differ. In E.U. countries contracts are typically staggered, i. e. 
different groups bargain at different times (see Layard et al., 1991; Addison and Siebert, 1993). In the U.S., 
wage negotiations are usually sequential (see Flanagan, 1993). In Japan, wages are negotiated 
simultaneously in the ‘Spring offensive’ (see Sasajima, 1993). 
2 See Freeman and Medoff (1984, pp. 170-171), Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Fallick and Hassett 
(1999). 
  2uncover a negative association between union power and R&D,3 but the evidence from the 
few European studies is less compelling. They use micro-econometric evidence in the U.K. 
from firms and plants, and find that when unions bargain only over wages there is a simple 
negative relationship between union power and R&D. However, Machin and Wadhwani 
(1991) provide evidence, for the U.K., that indicates that labor unions can encourage 
investment. Schnabel and Wagner (1992) show that unions do not appear to have a 
negative impact on innovative activity in West Germany.  
 
There are papers that find that the effect of unions on investment incentives is 
negative. In this regard, Grout (1984), Manning (1987) and Van der Ploeg (1987) show 
that unions can cause underinvestment because employers will be vulnerable to ex post 
exploitation by workers once the capital stock has been accumulated. Ulph and Ulph 
(1994) show that when unions bargain only over wages then increases in own union power 
will always reduce the probability of the firm winning a patent race.  
 
However, other papers find that the union effect on investment incentives can be 
positive. In this regard, Tauman and Weiss (1987) consider the effect of unionization on 
the adoption of technology in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number 
of firms, some of which are unionized. They show that the higher cost of union labor can 
induce labor-saving innovation. Ulph and Ulph (1998) show that the presence of a strong 
union can help a firm to win a patent race. Calabuig and González-Maestre (2002) analyze 
the effect of union structure on the adoption of a innovation considering that workers can 
set up an independent union in each firm or a single industry-wide union. They show that 
with a large (small) enough market size, the incentive to innovate is higher under the first 
(second) type of union.  
 
We consider in our paper that there are two firms that invest in R&D. The 
investment of each firm increases the productivity of its labor. The cost of R&D is 
assumed to be quadratic, reflecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D 
expenditures (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). The only factor of production is 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Connolly et al. (1986) and Hirsch and Link (1987). 
  3labor and all workers are unionized. To determine the wage set in each firm, we consider 
the monopoly-union model (see Booth, 1995). This model assumes that the union chooses 
the wage while the firm, once the wage is set by the union, chooses the employment level. 
Usually, the timing of wage setting is a long-run decision and, thus, we assume that unions 
decide whether wages are set sequentially or simultaneously before firms decide R&D 
investments.  
 
The results obtained in this paper are explained by two effects. First, the effect that 
arises when unions set wages sequentially (the strategic effect). When firms do not invest 
in R&D, the leader union in the sequential wage setting sets a higher wage than the 
follower, and both set a higher wage than in the simultaneous game.4 Secondly, the effect 
that the R&D investment of the firms has on the productivity of labor (the productivity 
effect). When firms invest in R&D, we obtain that the greater investment in R&D is made 
by the firm whose union is the follower in the sequential wage setting (the follower firm); 
the lower investment is made by the firm whose union is the leader in the sequential wage 
setting (the leader firm).5 As a result, the productivity of labor is greatest (lowest) in the 
follower (leader) firm. Moreover, total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set 
simultaneously.6 
 
  When firms do not invest in R&D, the leader union sets a higher wage than the 
follower and the number of employees hired by the leader firm is lower than that of the 
follower firm since, in this case there is only the strategic effect. However, when firms 
                                                 
4 See De Fraja (1993), Corneo (1995) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo (2000, 2001). 
5 We obtain a different result than when firms can decide their investment in R&D, sequentially or 
simultaneously (see Madjid et al., 2000). In this case, when both firms invest in R&D, there are no spillovers 
and the production cost of the firms is exogenous, it is obtained that the leader makes the greater investment 
in R&D and the follower the lower.  
6 This result is consistent with the empirical evidence and helps to explain that evidence in part. In Japan 
wages are negotiated simultaneously while in the E.U. and in the U.S. wages are negotiated sequentially. The 
GDP share of R&D expenditure in the period 1991-2001 is greater in Japan than in the E.U. and the U.S. For 
example, in Japan the GDP share of R&D expenditures in 2001 is 3.09, in the U.S. it is 2.82, and in the E.U. 
it is 1.9 (OECD, 2003). 
  4invest in R&D, the wage set by the leader union can be higher or lower than the wage set 
by the follower union. We obtain that if the efficiency of the technology is low enough, the 
higher wage is paid to the less productive workers. If the efficiency of the technology is 
great enough, the more productive workers get the higher wage. Similarly, the number of 
employees hired by the leader firm can be higher or lower than those hired by the follower 
firm.7 We obtain that if the efficiency of the technology is low enough, the firm that has 
the more productive workers hires the more employees; by contrast, if the efficiency of the 
technology is high enough the firm with the less productive workers hires more employees. 
These results depend on whether the productivity effect or the strategic effect is dominant.  
 
  The literature on wage bargaining shows that when firms do not invest in R&D 
unions always prefer to set wages sequentially since they obtain a greater utility than if 
wages are set simultaneously. By contrast, we show that when firms invest in R&D unions 
may prefer to set wages simultaneously. This result is obtained if the size of the market is 
small enough and the efficiency of the R&D technology is great enough, since the 
productivity effect then dominates the strategic effect. In this case, unions choose to set 
wages simultaneously and the total expenditure on R&D of the firms is greatest under 
simultaneous wage setting. By contrast, when unions choose to set wages sequentially, 
firms’ expenditure on R&D is at its lowest. Therefore, the timing of wage setting chosen 
by unions can stimulate or reduce total expenditure on R&D by firms. 
 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 states the model. In section 3 
we analyze, as a benchmark case, the case in which firms do not invest in R&D. Section 4 
                                                 
7 Comparing the labor markets of various OECD-member countries we can observe an increasing wage 
inequality over time for some countries. The literature that analyzes this question (see, for example, Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 1998, 1999; Aghion et. al, 1999) points out that there are 
three main types of inequality: skill-based wage differentials (called college or wage premium), inequality 
between groups of the same educational level (within group inequality) and age related wage differentials. In 
this paper we consider the second type of inequality and show that when firms invest in R&D that increases 
the productivity of labor, the wages set by unions can differ depending on whether wages are set sequentially 
or simultaneously.  
  5shows the results of the model when firms invest in R&D. Finally, section 5 offers 
conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
 
  We consider a market for a single homogenous good in which there are two firms, 
A and B. The industry inverse demand function for the product is:  
 
p = a – qA – qB, a > 4r,8     (1) 
 
where p is the price and qi is the output level of firm i (i=A, B). 
 
The only factor used in the production process is labor. Firm i hires Li workers with 
a uniform wage rate wi, i=A, B. All workers are unionized and there is an independent 
union in each firm. The utility function of the union of firm i is:  
 
Ui(wi, Li) = (wi – r)Li, i=A, B,       ( 2 )  
 
where  r is the reservation wage, which can be interpreted as the wage earned in the 
competitive sector. Unions as well as firms are risk neutral. Unions have the objective of 
income maximization. To determine the wage set in each firm, we consider the monopoly-
union model (see Booth, 1995). This model assumes that the unions set the wage while the 
firms, once the wage is set by the unions, choose the employment level. 
 
 Firm  i invests in R&D which increases the productivity of its labor. We assume, for 
the sake of simplicity, that there are no R&D externalities. The cost of R&D is assumed to 
                                                 
8 We assume that a>4r to simplify the exposition of the results of the model when comparing the number of 
employees level hired by the firms under the different wage setting structures. This assumption does not alter 
the main results of the paper. If we interpret parameter a as the size of the market, this restriction implies that 
the size of the market must not be excessively small. 
  6be quadratic, reflecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures (see 
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measures the technology efficiency, so that a low value of the parameter indicates higher 
efficiency in the R&D technology. 
 
  The productive technology in firm i is linear in the amount of labor hired; however, 








, i=A, B.        ( 4 )  
 
From expression (4) we get that 
i x β − 1
1
 is the marginal productivity of labor (we 
denote it as the productivity of labor), for a given value of the investment in R&D, xi. 
Expression (4) shows that the productivity of labor in firm i increases with its R&D 






β − = <0). Parameter β measures how the investment in R&D of firm i 
affects its number of employees, for a given output level, qi. Thus, for a given qi, the 
greater the value of this parameter, the lower the number of employees hired by firm i. 
 
  The profit function of firm i is: 
 
                                                 
9 Condition γ>γ assures that 1-βxi>0 (i=A, B). This condition also assures that second order conditions hold. 




2, i≠j; i, j=A, B,     (5) 
 
where, from equation (4), Li =  ) 1 ( i i x q β − . 
 
  We assume that the timing of the wage setting is endogenously determined and is 
decided by unions since we are assuming the monopoly-union model (and, thus, the wage 
is set by unions). There is only one production period and unions have to decide whether to 
set their wage at time t=0 or at time t=1. Given that the timing of wage setting is a long-run 
decision we assume that unions decide whether to set wages sequentially or simultaneously 
before firms decide their investments on R&D. Therefore, the timing of the game is as 
follows. In the first stage, unions decide whether to set wages sequentially or 
simultaneously. In the second stage, firms simultaneously decide their investments on 
R&D. In the third stage, unions set wages either sequentially or simultaneously. Finally, in 
the fourth stage, firms make quantity decisions and hire labor. We solve backwards to get a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
3. Benchmark case: firms do not invest in R&D 
 
  Before analyzing the results of the model when firms invest in R&D, we are going 
to show the results recorded in the relevant literature when unions set wages and firms do 
not invest in R&D (see De Fraja, 1993; Corneo, 1995; Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2000, 
2001). In this case, the game has three stages. In the first stage, unions decide whether to 
set wages sequentially or simultaneously. In the second stage, unions set wages either 
sequentially or simultaneously. Finally, in the third stage, firms choose their output and 
employment levels. We denote the case in which unions set wages simultaneously 
(sequentially) by superscript SI (SE). 
 
  In the third stage, firms choose the output level that maximizes their profits 
(expression (5)), for xi=0. Next, in the second stage, both unions sequentially or 
simultaneously set the wage that maximizes their utility function (expression (2)). When 
  8unions set wages sequentially, union i sets the wage before union j does. Solving these 
problems we obtain the following result. 
 
Lemma 1. When firms do not invest in R&D,  in equilibrium:  , 




















j U U > >
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
  The result obtained in this lemma is due to the fact that wages are strategic 
complements and that, in the sequential game, union i sets the wage before union j does (i. 
e. union i is the leader in the wage setting). When union i sets the wage in the sequential 
game, this union considers the wage of the other union as given. As a result, union i sets a 
higher wage than union j, and both set higher wage than in the simultaneous game.10 Thus, 
firm i looses market share, firm j gains market share and firm j hires more workers than 
firm i obtaining a higher profit. But the union of firm j will obtain a higher utility than the 
union of firm i since, in this case, employment outweighs wages in the utility function of 
unions.11  
 
  In the first stage, unions decide whether to set wages sequentially or 
simultaneously. Given that U , both unions prefer to set wages sequentially. 




j U U > >
 
                                                 
10 We get the usual result, that is, when variables are strategic complements, the leader chooses a higher 
value of the variable than the follower. 
11 It must be noted that if the wage is bargained between firms and unions, where the bargaining power of 
the firms is α and the bargaining power of the unions is (1-α), we get that  , where 
 if and only if α>0.2243. We also obtain that   and   for all α. 
Therefore, if α is low (high) enough, employment has a greater (lower) weight than wages in the utility 
















i w w w > >
  9Lemma 2. When firms do not invest in R&D,  in equilibrium both unions set wages 
sequentially. 
 
4. Results when firms invest in R&D 
 
  We first solve the fourth stage of the game, obtaining the equilibrium in the product 
market. The profit function of firm i is given by expression (5). Solving the first order 
conditions for profit maximization we obtain the equilibrium output (and employment) 
levels and profits, as a function of wage rates and R&D investments: 
 
qi(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) = 
3
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 j j i i x w x w a β β − + − −
,  
Li(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) =
3
)) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 )( 1 ( j j i i i x w x w a x β β β − + − − −
, 




)) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 (
i
j j i i x
x w x w a γ β β
−
− + − −
, i≠j; i,j=A,B. 
 (6) 
 
  First we analyze the case in which both unions set wages simultaneously.  
 
4.1 Unions set wages simultaneously 
 
  In the third stage, unions simultaneously choose the wage that maximizes their 
utility function (expression (2)): 
 
wi(wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) = arg max [(wi(xi, xj) – r) Li(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj)], i≠j; i,j=A,B,  (7) 
             wi 
 
where  Li(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) is given by expression (6). Solving the first order 
condition for (7) we get the wage and employment level of both firms as a function of 
R&D investments: 
 
  10wi (xi, xj) = 
) 1 ( 15









, i≠j; i,j=A,B.       (8) 
 
  Equation (8) shows that the wage of firm i decreases with the rival’s level of R&D, 
xj, since it increases the output level of firm j. By contrast, the wage of firm i increases 
with its investment in R&D since it increases the productivity of its labor.12 
 
  In the second stage, firm i chooses R&D investment, xi, that maximizes its profits. 
Solving this problem, and substituting in (2), (6) and (8) we get the following result. 
 
Lemma 3. When unions set wages simultaneously, the R&D investment of the firms, the 
wage set by unions, the output and employment levels of the firms, the profit of the firms 
and the utility of the unions are: 
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  We now consider the case in which unions set wages sequentially.  
 
4.2 Unions set wages sequentially 
 
  We assume in this case that union i sets the wage before union j does. In the third 
stage, union j sets the wage bearing in mind that union i has already set its wage. Thus, the 
wage set by union j is given by the solution to the following problem: 
 
wj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) = argmax[(wj(xi, xj)–r)Lj(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj)], i≠j; i,j=A,B,     (9) 
             wj 
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, i≠j; i,j=A, B. 
  11where  Lj(wi(xi, xj),  wj(xi, xj),  xi,  xj) is given by expression (6). Solving the first order 
condition for (9) we get that: 
 
wj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) =
) 1 ( 4








− + − +
.    (10) 
 
Union i sets its wage by solving the following maximization problem: 
 
     wi(xi, xj) = arg max [(wi(xi, xj)–r) Li(wi(xi, xj), wj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj), xi, xj)], i≠j;  i,j=A,B, 
           wi 
 
where wj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) is given by (10) and Li(wi, xi, xj) is obtained by substituting (10) in 
(6). The wages set by unions, depending on R&D levels, are: 
 
wi(xi, xj) =
) 1 ( 14









, wj(xi, xj) =
) 1 ( 56









.     (11) 
 
  We obtain from expression (11) that the wage paid by each firm increases with its 
investment in R&D since the productivity of its labor increases with this investment.13  
 





C ,  2 2 4 3 42336 ) 678 343 ( 15 1274 γ γ β β + + −
−
=
r a r ar
r a
D , 
and  2 2 4 3 42336 ) 3129 1976 ( 3 1274 γ γ β β + + −
−
=
r a r ar
r a
E . In the second stage, firm i chooses the 
R&D investment, xi, that maximizes its profits. Solving this problem, and substituting in 
(2), (6) and (11) we get the following result. 
 
Lemma 4. When unions set wages sequentially, the R&D investment of the firms, the wage 
set by unions, the output and employment levels of the firms, the profit of the firms and the 
utility of the unions are: 
                                                 
13  0
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4.3 Comparison between the two cases 
 
  Next we compare the results obtained in lemmas 3 and 4. There are two effects that 
explain the results obtained in this comparison. First, the strategic effect that arises when 
unions set wages sequentially (the strategic effect). Secondly, the effect of the R&D 
investment of the firms on the productivity of labor (the productivity effect).  
 
By comparing the investment in R&D of the firms in the two wage setting 
structures considered, we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. In equilibrium:  
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Proof. See Appendix 
 
  13  This proposition shows that the firm whose union is the follower in the sequential 
wage setting (the follower firm) invests more than the firms do when their unions set 
wages simultaneously. The investment in this last case is greater than that of the firm 
whose union is the leader in the sequential wage setting (the leader firm). Therefore, the 
follower firm makes the greater expenditure on R&D and the leader firm the lower. 
Finally, total expenditures on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. 
 
  When firms invest in R&D, they decide their investment simultaneously taking into 
account that wages are set either sequentially or simultaneously. From equations (8) and 
(11) we obtain that the wage paid by each firm increases with its R&D investment. 
Therefore, when deciding its R&D investment, each firm takes into account how its 
investment affects the wage set by unions. 
 
When firms do not invest in R&D (see lemma 1) it is obtained that 
 due to the strategic effect that arises when wages are set sequentially. 
When firms invest in R&D, this strategic effect means that, in the sequential case, the 
wage set by the leader union increases more with the R&D investment of its firm than the 
wage set in the simultaneous case, and this latter wage increases more than the wage set by 
the follower union with the R&D of its firm. As a result, although the productivity of labor 
increases with investment in R&D, the leader firm chooses lower investment to avoid the 
wage paid to its workers increasing excessively. On the other hand, as R&D decisions are 





i w w w > >
                                                 
14 Madjid et al. (2000) analyze the case in which firms can decide their investment in R&D sequentially or 
simultaneously. When both firms invest in R&D, there are no spillovers and the production cost of the firms 
is exogenous, they obtain that:  . This result is different from that obtained in proposition 1 
since the R&D investments of the firms are strategic substitutes and, thus, the leader in the R&D decision 
invests more than the follower. The investment in the simultaneous case is between these two values. On the 
other hand, it can be shown that   is also obtained if R&D decisions are taken simultaneously 
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  14 
  Given that the cost of R&D increases with investment in R&D we get that 
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γ γ γ
> > . Therefore, the greater expenditure in R&D is made by the 
follower firm and the lower expenditure by the leader firm. However, when unions set 
wages simultaneously, the aggregated expenditure of the firms on R&D is greater than 
when unions set wages sequentially since the investment of the follower firm is sufficiently 
greater than that of the leader firm.  
 
This proposition also shows that the productivity of labor depends on the 
investment in R&D of the firms and, thus, the productivity of labor differs depending on 
whether wages are set sequentially or simultaneously. Given that  , the 
productivity of labor is highest in the follower firm, lowest in the leader firm, and takes an 
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  Next we compare the wages set by unions in the two wage setting structures. Let 
γw1 and γw2, respectively, the values of parameter γ such that  and  , 
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Proof. See Appendix 
 
  If the efficiency of the technology is low enough, i.e. if parameter γ is great enough 
(γw2<γ), we obtain the same result as when firms do not invest in R&D (see lemma 1): 
  15SI SE
j
SE
i w w w > > . Given that the R&D investment of firms decreases with parameter γ,15 
if this parameter is great enough the investment in R&D of the firms is low enough. Thus, 
the strategic effect dominates the productivity effect. It must be noted that when firms do 
not invest in R&D, there is only the strategic effect. In this case, the firm with the less 
productive workers (firm i) pays the higher wage. 
 
  If the efficiency of the technology is high enough, i.e. if parameter γ is low enough 
(γ≤γw1), we obtain that  . Given that the R&D investment of firms is great 
enough (since it decreases with parameter  γ), the productivity effect dominates the 
strategic effect. Given that  , proposition 1 shows that the productivity of 
labor is greatest in the follower firm and lowest in the leader firm. On the other hand, as 
the wage increases with the productivity of labor, the higher wage is paid by the follower 
firm and the lower by the leader firm. In this case, the more productive workers receive the 
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When parameter γ takes an intermediate value (γw1<γ≤γw2), we obtain that 
. In this case, neither of the two effects dominates; these two effects affect 
firms in different ways. The productivity effect causes the follower union to set the higher 
wage in this zone. However, the strategic effect makes the leader union set a higher wage 
than when unions set wages simultaneously ( ). The firms spend most on R&D 
when wages are set simultaneously, and pay the lowest wages. The highest wage is paid by 
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j  since γ>γ. 
  16  Next we compare the labor hired by firms in the two wage setting structures. Let 
γL1, γL2 and γL3, respectively, be value of parameter γ such that  ,   and 
, where 
SI SE
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i L L = γ<γL1<γL2<γL3. 
 
Proposition 3. There are three values of parameter  γ,  γL1,  γL2  and  γL3,  such that  in 
equilibrium:   if γ≤γL1,   if γL1<γ≤γL2,   if 
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Proof. See Appendix 
 
  The result obtained in proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. We show in the 
Appendix that the number of employees hired by firms increases with parameter γ since 
the higher the value of this parameter the lower the efficiency of the technology. As a 
result, the higher the value of γ, the lower the investment in R&D and the greater the labor 
hired by the firms. 
 
  Figure 1. Comparison of the labor hired by the firms. 
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  17When the firms do not invest in R&D (see lemma 1), it is obtained that 
, which implies that  . When firms invest in R&D (see 
proposition 1) we obtain the same result as when they do not invest in R&D if parameter γ 
is great enough (γL3<γ). In this case, as the investment of the firms decreases with 
parameter γ, the investment of the firms is low enough. Therefore, the strategic effect 
dominates the productivity effect. In this case, the firm with the more (less) productive 








j L L L > >
 
When parameter γ is low enough (γ≤γL1), the result is due to the productivity effect. 
In this case, as the investment of the firms decreases with parameter γ, this investment is 
great enough. Therefore, given that  , the productivity of labor is greatest in 
the follower firm and lowest in the leader firm. As a result, the follower firm (which has 
the more productive workers) hires less labor lower and the leader firm (which has the less 
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 When  parameter  γ takes an intermediate value, the labor hired by firms depends on 
both the wage paid by firms and the productivity of labor. The two effects are mixed up, 
and thus   if γL1<γ≤γL2 and   if γL2<γ≤γL3. In these two zones, 
the less labor is hired when unions set wages simultaneously. We have seen that the 
productivity effect (the strategic effect) implies that the leader firm (the follower firm) 
hires the least (most) labor. Thus, if γL1<γ≤γL2, the productivity effect causes the leader 
firm to hire the most labor, while the strategic effect makes  ; as a result: 
. If γL2<γ≤γL3, the strategic effect makes the follower firm hire most labor, 
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By comparing the output levels and the profits of the firms in the two wage setting 
structures considered, we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 4. In equilibrium:  
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Proof. See Appendix 
 
  When firms invest in R&D we obtain the same result as when firms do not invest in 
R&D, even though the wage set by the follower union may be higher than the wage set by 
the leader union. From proposition 1 we have that the productivity of labor increases with 
investment in R&D and, thus, the workers of the follower firm are more productive than 
the workers of the firms that set wages simultaneously, and the latter are more productive 
than the workers of the leader firm. Therefore, the strategic effect and the productivity 
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 Given  that  j q q > , the follower firm has the greater market share and the 
leader firm the smaller. As a result, although the follower firm has the greater total cost of 
R&D investment and the leader firm the lower (since  ) and although the 
follower firm can pay the greater wage, the greater (smaller) market share of the follower 
(leader) firm means that  . 
SE
i
SI SE q >
SI SE








  Next we compare the utility obtained by unions in the two wage setting structures. 
Let γU denote the value of parameter γ such that  , where  , 
γU>
SI SE
i U U =
2 2 0419 . 11 β γ r U =
γ. 
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j U U > > U when a<78.8088r. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
  19When the market is small enough (a<78.8088r), if γ <γU we obtain that the utility 
of the follower union is greater than that obtained by the unions in the simultaneous case, 





j U U > >
SI SE U ≥
U, we get that the follower union obtains greater utility than the leader and both 
obtain greater utility than if wages are set simultaneously (U ). This last 
result is also obtained if the market is big enough (a≥78.8088r) independently of the value 





  The result shown in this proposition is illustrated in figure 2. When firms do not 
invest in R&D (see lemma 1) it is obtained that   and  . 
This implies that U  since the employment level outweighs the wage in the 
utility function of unions. This result is due to the strategic effect. When firms invest in 
R&D we also obtain that the follower union obtains the greater utility. We have seen in 
propositions 2 and 3 that the strategic effect causes the leader union to set a greater wage 
than the follower and the follower firm to hire more labor than the leader. By contrast, the 
productivity effect causes the follower union to set a higher wage than the leader, and the 
leader firm to hire more employees than the follower. Therefore, the strategic effect 
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By comparing the utility obtained by the leader union with that obtained by unions 
when wages are set simultaneously, we get (see Appendix) that U   if  γ
SI SE
i U > U<γ. 
Therefore, if parameter γ is great enough (γU<γ), the strategic effect dominates since the 
investment in R&D of the firms is low enough. By contrast, if parameter γ is low enough 
(γU>γ), the productivity effect dominates since the investment of the firms is great enough. 
It must be noted that γU<γ if a≥78.8088r; therefore, if parameter a is great enough the 
strategic effect dominates implying that U . If γ
SI SE
i U > U>γ (γU≤γ) when a<78.8088r, the 







4.4 Unions decide whether to set wages at t=0 or t=1 
 
  In stage one, unions decide whether to set wages at t=0 or t=1. If the two unions set 
wages simultaneously at t=0 or t=1, they obtain: U00=U11=USI. If unions set wages 
sequentially, one sets wages at t=0 and the other at t=1; they obtain: U  and 








Proposition 6. In equilibrium, one union sets its wage at t=0 and the other at t=1 if (i) 
γU≤γ when a<78.8088r and if (ii) a≥78.8088r; the two unions set wages at t=1 if 
a<78.8088r when γ <γU.16 
 
This proposition shows that if (i) γU≤γ when a<78.8088r and if (ii) a≥78.8088r there 
are two equilibria. In each of them, one union sets wages at t=0 and the other at t=1. This 
result is also obtained in the literature (see De Fraja, 1993; Corneo, 1995; Bárcena-Ruiz 
                                                 
16 We believe that if we consider that the wage is bargained between firm and unions, the result obtained in 
this proposition holds since it is due to the strategic and productivity effects, and these effects do not change 
if the wage is bargained between firm and unions. 
  21and Campo, 2000, 2001). Given that U , a coordination problem might arise in the 
game since each union would like to set its wage after the other union does. This may lead 
both unions to choose their wage at t=1, which reduces the utility of the unions 
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On the other hand, if the market is small enough (a<78.8088r) when γ <γU, both unions 
set wages at t=1 and, thus, they prefer to set wages simultaneously. When firms do not 
invest in R&D, unions set wages sequentially since there is only the strategic effect. When 
firms invest in R&D, the productivity effect dominates the strategic effect, which leads 




  The literature that studies the interaction between union-firm bargaining structures 
and innovation does not consider that wages can be bargained either sequentially or 
simultaneously, which affects the R&D investments of firms. To fill this gap in the 
literature, we have analyzed how the timing of wage bargaining affects investment in R&D 
by firms, in the context of a duopolistic Cournot competition. We have also studied 
whether unions prefer to set wages sequentially or simultaneously when firms invest in 
R&D. 
 
  The literature on wage bargaining shows that when firms do not invest in R&D, 
unions prefer to set wages sequentially rather than simultaneously (see, De Fraja, 1993; 
Corneo, 1995; Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2000, 2001). This result is due to the effect that 
arises when unions set wages sequentially (the strategic effect). However, when firms 
invest in R&D a second effect arises since the investment of firms affects the productivity 
of labor (the productivity effect). We obtain that the firm whose union is the follower in 
the sequential wage setting (the follower firm) invests more than firms when unions set 
wages simultaneously; and investment in this latter case is greater than that of the firm 
whose union is the leader in the sequential wage setting (the leader firm). As a result, the 
  22total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously and the 
productivity of labor is greatest (lowest) in the follower (leader) firm. 
 
  We show in the paper that when firms invest in R&D unions may prefer to set 
wages simultaneously. This result is obtained when the market is small enough and the 
efficiency of the R&D technology is great enough since, in that case, the productivity 
effect dominates the strategic effect. In that case, unions set wages simultaneously which 
stimulates total expenditure on R&D by firms, since this expenditure is greater when 
wages are set simultaneously rather than sequentially. By contrast, when unions choose to 
set wages sequentially, firms’ expenditure on R&D is at its lowest. Therefore, the structure 
of wage setting chosen by unions can stimulate or reduce total expenditure on R&D by 
firms. 
 
  One possible extension of this paper would be to consider a different function to 
relate investment in R&D of the firms to the productivity of labor. We think that the main 
results are robust to changes in this function since the results of the paper are due to the 





Proof of lemma 1.  
 
Next we show the results obtained when firms do not invest in R&D. When unions 
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When unions set wages sequentially we obtain: 
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  Comparing the results obtained in these two cases, we obtain the result shown in 
lemma 1. 
 
Proof of proposition 1.  
 
Comparing the R&D investments of the firms in the two wage setting structures, 
we get the following results: 
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Proof of proposition 2.  
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Therefore,  if and only if γ>γw1. 
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In expression (A.2),  0
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  25  The denominator of expression (A.3) is positive since γ>γ. It can be shown that the 
numerator of (A.3) decreases with parameter γ if and only if γ<γb, where 
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 If  γ=γ, then  < . If γ=γb, then  < . If γ tends to ∞, then  > . 
Then, there exists a value of parameter γ, γw2, such that  > if and only if γ>γw2 (see 
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  Expression (A.4) is negative since both its numerator and its denominator are 
positive. Therefore, γw2>γw1 (see figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of  wi
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Proof of proposition 3.  
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The denominator of (A.5) is positive since γ>γ. To obtain the sign of the numerator 
we divide it in two terms: 
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  27The denominator of (A.6) is positive since γ>γ. To obtain the sign of the numerator, 
we divide it in two terms: 
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It can be shown that if γ = γ, then  . On the other hand, If γ tends to 
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and that  ,   and   are strictly increasing with γ, we get (see Figure 1) that there 
exists a value of γ,  γL1,  such that  = ; there exists a value of γ,  γL2, such that 
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Proof of proposition 4.  
 




) 42336 15315 1274 )( 405 56 (
) 5670 717 49 ( ) ( 12
2 2 2 4 4 2 2





γ γ β β γ β
γ γ β β γ
r r r
r r r a
q q
SI SE
j , ∀ γ>γ. 
ii)  0
) 42336 15315 1274 )( 405 56 (
39690 15 1274 ( ) ( 6
2 2 2 4 4 2 2





γ γ β β γ β
γ γ β β γ
r r r
r r r a
q q
SI SE
i , ∀ γ>γ. 
 




j q q q > >
  28 
Comparing the profits obtained by the firms in the two wage setting structures, we 
get the following: 
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Proof of proposition 5.  
 
Comparing the utility obtained by the unions in the two wage setting structures, we 
get the following: 
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It can be shown that (A.7) is positive for γ>γU, where 
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 Comparing  γU with γ we get: 
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The above expression is equal to zero for a=78.8088r, and thus, γU >γ  if and only 
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